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'We  characterize the class of n-person belief  systems for which  common 
belief has the properties of the strongest logic of belief, KD45. The characterizing 
condition states that individuals are not too mistaken in their beliefs about common 
beliefs. It is shown to be considerably weaker than the consistency condition on 
interpersonal  beliefs  implied  by  the  common  knowledge  assumption:  it  allows 
individuals to "agree to disagree" and to be quite incorrect about others
7  beliefs. 1.  Introduction 
The concepts of common knowledge and common belief have been discussed extensively 
1 
in  the literature,  both  syntactically and  semantically.  At  the individuaI level  the difference 
between knowledge and  belief is usually identified  with the presence or absence of the  Truth 
Axiom T:  A +  A,  which is interpreted as "if individual i believes that A,  then A". In such a 
case the individual is often said to know that A (thus it is possible for an individual to believe a 
false proposition but she cannot know a false proposition).  Going to the interpersonal level, the 
literature  then  distinguishes between common  knowledge  and  common  belief  on  the basis  of 
whether or not  the Truth  Axiom  is  postulated  at  the individual level. However,  while at  the 
individual level the Truth Axiom captures merely a relationship between the individual's  beliefs 
and the external world, at the interpersonal level it has very strong implications. For example, the 
following is a consequence of the Truth Axiom:  A +  A,  that is, if individual i believes 
that individual j believes that A, then individual i herself believes that A. *  Thus, in contrast to the 
other axioms, the Truth Axiom does not merely reflect individual agents' "logic of belief'. (The 
reason why the Truth Axiom is much stronger in  an interpersonal context  than appears at first 
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Aum.ann (1976): Bacharach (1985), Binmore and  Brandenburger (1990), Bonanno (1994), Colombetti 
(199:i),  Cieanakoplos (1992), Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982), Halpern (1986), Halpern and 
Moses (1992), Kaneko and  Nagashima (1993), Levis (1969), Lismont (1993), Lismont and. Mongin 
(199:1),  Milgrom (1981), Monderer and Samet (1989), Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990), Samet (1990), 
Shin (1993), Tan and Werlang (1985). 
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This can be seen as follows. First of all, any axiomatization of belief  will include the so called K axiom: 
(m  (,4 -, B) A  A) 4  B and the so-called rule of Necessitation: from A to infer IJ  A. Now, from 
the Truth  Axiom for individual j, 1  A -+  A,  and the rule of  Necessitation we  obtain the following 
theorem  (n  A +  A).  Hence, by Propositional Logic,  rn A -+  rn A A rn (rn A +  A).  By 
axiom K .the consequent of this last formula implies  A. glancie is ithat it  amounts to assuming that agreement of any individual's  belief with the truth is 
common  knowledge).  Given  its  logical  force,  it  is  not  surprising to find  that  it  has  strong 
implications for the logic of common knowledge. In particular, if each individual's beliefs satis@ 
the  strongest  logic  of  knowledge (namely  SS  or  KT5),  the  associated  common  knowledge 
opera.tor !satisfies this logic  too (for  technical details on this point  and  the following see the 
beginning of Section 2). Such is not the case for belief  bereft of the Truth  Axiom, even the 
strongest  logic  for  individual  belief  (KD45)  is  insufficient  to ensure  the  satisfaction  of  the 
"Negative Introspection" axiom for common belief  TW A +  rn 7m A  (where  denotes the 
common belief operator; see Colombetti, 1993, and Lismont and Mongin, 1994).  That is to say, 
it can happen that neither is A commonly believed nor is it common belief that A is not commonly 
believed. 
Negative Introspection  has been  variously challenged based  on  arguments of  bounded 
rationality (see, for example, Samet, 1990).  By contrast, we maintain full rationality of individuals 
and  invest.igate under what conditions "full  rationality" -that is, Negative Introspection -holds 
for comm'on beliefs. We note in  Section 2 that Negative Introspection for common belief (from 
now on, we shall refer to it  as "axiom S*")  amounts to common beliefs being "publicly known". 
The  main  result,  Theorem  1,  shows  that  common  belief  satisfies  axiom  5'  if  and  only  if 
individuals are not too mistaken about common beliefs. Formally, this condition is expressed as 
follows: (recall that  denotes the belief operator of individual i and  the common belief operator). 
Thus C*  has the following interpretation: if individual i believes that it is common belief that A 
then  it  is  not  the  case  that  individual  j  believes  that  not  A.  We  call  C*  the 
+-Compatibility  Axiom.  C*  is  much  weaker  than  the  Truth  Axiom  (O A + A).  It  allows 
individuals  to "agree to disagree" and  individuals'  beliefs about  others'  beliefs  can  be quite 
incorrect. In other words, the strong logic of common belief (KD45)  turns out to be quite robust, 
if not completely so. 
2.  Compatibility of belief systems 
Semantically,  the  notion  of  common  knowledge  is  represented  by  the  meet  of  the 
information partitions of the individuals. This is a partition itself and, therefore,  it  validates the 
same  axioms  that  are  postulated  for  the  individuals.  Requiring  information  partitions  at  the 
individual level  amounts to postulating the following axiom schemata for every individual i (we 
use the notation and names that are standard in modal logic: see, for example, Chellas, 1980): 
as well  as the rule  of inference of Necessitation: from  A to infer q A.  Axiom  schema 5 is 
sometimes referred to as the Negative Iiltrospectiorl axiom: if the individual does not know that A then she knows that  she  does  not  know that  A.  Since the  notion of common  knowledge is 
captured by  the meet of the information partitions, the common knowledge operator  will  also 
satisfi  axioms K,  T  and  5; in  particular,  it  will  be  true that  if  a  proposition is  not  common 
knowledge then it is common knowledge that it is not common knowledge. 
Moving from  knowledge to belief implies dropping the Truth  Axiom  T. The strongest 
axiomatization of belief at the individual level will then be represented by  the following axiom 
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schemata (as well as the inference rule of Necessitation): 
Axiom schema D is the Comistency axiom: it says that an individual cannot believe that A and at 
the  same  time  believe  that  not  A.  Axiom  schema  4  is  often  referred  to  as  the  Positive 
Introspection axiom: if  the  individual  knows that  A then  she  knows that  she  knows that  A. 
Semantically,  the  above  axiom  schemata  correspond  to  the  following  properties  of  the 
4 
accessibility relation (cf Chellas, 1980, pp. 76-80): 
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It is well known (see Chellas, 1980) that axioms D and 1  are theorems of the KT5 (or S5)  logic. 
Economists often  use  information  functions  rather  than  accessibility  relations. The  two  notions, 
w 
however, are equivalent. An information function is a function I : W +  2'., where W is a set of 
"states" or "possible worlds". Given such a function one can define the corresponding accessibility AXIOM  SCHEMA 
K.  m(A-+B)r\nA +  aB 
T.  OA--+A 
D.  mA-++J,A 
4. OA-bIOA 
5.  +JA+~+JA 
PROPERTY OF ACCESSIBILITY RELATION 
no restrictions 
Reflexivity:  Va, aRia 
Seriality: Va, 3 P : aR.P 
Transitivity: Va, V P, Vy, if aRiP  and 
PR,y  then  aR.y 
Euclideanness:  Va, VP, Vy, if aR.P and 
aRiy then  PRiy 
For a syntactic axiomatization of the concept of common belief see Halpern and Moses (1992), 
Lismont (1993) and Lismont and Mongin (1994). We review it in  Appendix 1. Semantically, the 
notion of common belief is  captured  by  the transitive closure of the union of the accessibility 
5  relations of the individuals.  It is easy to see from this that if the individuals'  belief operators 
satis@ axiom  D  (respectively,  T)  then  the  common  belief  operator  also  satisfies  axiom  D 
(respectivdy,  T).  Furthermore,  the  common  belief  operator  will  always  satis@  axiom  4. 
relation as follows: aRP if and only if  P€I(a). Conversely, given an accessibility relation R on W 
one can define the corresponding information function as follows: I(a) = (P : aRP}.  For example, 
if  I,(*  ) denotes the information function of individual i, then reflexivity of  i's accessibility relation 
corresponds to the following property of the information function: for every a,  adi(a). 
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Let  R,,  ..., Rn be binary relations on a set W and let R* denote the transitive closure of  the union of 
these relations. Then R* is a binary relation on W defined as follows: for all a,PeW, aR*P if and 
only if  there is a sequence  i,, ...  im in (1, ...,  n) and a sequence q,,  q,, ..., qm  in W such that: 
(i) q,, = a, (ii) q,  = P and (iii) for every k = 0, ..., m-  1, qkRi  qk+,.  k+l Therefore, the only property at  issue is the Negative Introspection axiom at  the "interpersonal 
level", which we will denote by  5':  A +  A. 
It  has  been  noted  (Colombetti, 1993,  Lismont  and  Mongin,  1994)  that,  even  if  one 
imposes axioms K, D, 4 and 5 at the individual level, axiom 5*  need not hold, that is, it is possible 
that  A is  not common belief and  yet  it  is  not the case that it  is common belief that  A is  not 
common belief  An example of this is given below (Figure 1). Note that  5*  implies the following: 
Since the complementary axiom: 
is pan of the axiomatization of common belief (see Appendix I),  P*  amounts to saying that there 
is shared knowledge about common belief. Note also that 5'  is, in fact, equivalent to P*  (a proof 
of this claim is given in Appendix 2). 
Tlne following example shows that, even if individual beliefs satisfy KD45,  the common 
belief operator need not satisfy 5*.  Let there be two individuals, 1 and 2 and two worlds, a and J3. 
Let p be a sentence which is true at a and false at P. Let the accessibility relations  R, and R, be 
as illustrated in Figure 1 and let  Tr R,u%  be the transitive closure of  the union of R, and I$ 
(which, in this case, coincides with R,u&:  see Figure 1). 
1 ~nsert  Figure 1  I FIGURE 1 
Note that R, is an equivalence relation and R, is serial, transitive and euclidean. Hence they both 
validate K, D, 4 and  5. Denote  Tr R,uR,  by R,.  Since p is false at  P  and  PR$,  p is  not 
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common belief at P, that is, the formula lm  (p) is true at P.  On the other hand, p is common 
belief at a, that is, the formula  (p)  is true at a.  It follows that, since PR,u,  it is not common 
belief at P that p is not common belief, that is, the following formula is false  at  P:  (p). 
Thus we can conclude that at  P the formula (1B  p -+  +J  p),  which is sm  instance of axiom 
schema 5*,  is false. To put it differently, the above example shows that the transitive closure of n 
relations, each of which is serial, transitive and euclidean, is not necessarily euclidean. 
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Recall that. for every formula A,  A is true at world 6 if and only if A is true at every w'orld y such that 
6Riy. Similarly for  A.  See Appendix 1 for more details on this. The example of Figure 1 has the following feature: at world  P individual 1 believes that 
not p while individual 2 believes that p. In other words their beliefs are completely incompatible 
(the two individuals are "worlds apart").  This situation cannot arise whe:n the Truth Axiom is 
imposed at the individual level, because at  any world a there will  be a world, namely a itself, 
which everybody can access, hence complete disagreement is ruled out. In this paper we explore 
the implications of merely requiring interpersonal compatibility of beliefs, in various forms, while 
avoiding .the  extra strong implications of the Truth Axiom. 
We begin with a simple, but rather strong, axiom which we call the Compatibility Axiom 
and denote by C: 
Axiom C is the interpersonal counterpart of the consistency axiom D: it says that it is not possible 
for one individual to believe that A and, at the same time,  for another individual to believe that 
not A. Thus if individual i believes that A,  then individual j must allow for the possibility that A. 
Note that by  choosing i = j we obtain the consistency axiom D at the individual level. Thus C 
implies D for every individual. The following proposition gives the semantic counterpart of axiom 
C. To prove Proposition 1 we need to make use of notation and definitions from modal logic and 
therefore we postpone the proof  to Appendix 2. 
PROPOSITION  1.  Axiom  C  is characterized by  the following property of the set 
{R,, .. .,  Rn)  (where Ri is the accessibility relation of individual i, i = 1, . .., n): 
Compatibility:  Vi, Vj, Va, 3  : aRiP  and &,P. That is,  every model where the set  {R,,  ...,  Rn) satisfies the Compatibility property  validates 
axiom C and, conversely, given  a  set  of relations {R,,  ...,  Rn) that  violateis the Compatibility 
property, there is a model based on it and an instance of axiom C which is falsified at some world 
in the model. 
In Section 3 it will be shown that Compatibility is sufficient to yield 5*;  however, it is far 
from necessary, as the example of Figure 2 below shows. 
FIGURE 2 
In the above example, Compatibility is violated (hence, by Proposition 1, there is a model based 
on this frame that falsifies axiom C). On the other hand, Tr R,uR, is euclidean (in fact it is an 
equivalence relation), hence 5*  is valid  in this frame. Necessary  conditions  for  5*  generally  involve  the  common  belief  operator  in  their 
statement (on this point see the example of Figure 7 in Section 3). As theorem 1 below shows, a 
necessary  and  sufficient condition  for  5*  is  that  individuals  be  correct  in  their  beliefs  that 
something is commonly believed: 
rn/TJA  -, HA. 
Note that: it follows fiom the definition of common belief that (if individual beliefs are consistent) 
individua:ls must be correct in their belief that  something is not common blelief (for a proof see 
Appendix 2): 
Thus TN*  amounts to requiring that individual beliefs about common beliefs be correct. Since 5* 
is also equivalent to P*  (+  A +  rn 10  A),  it is equivalent to the property that common beliefs 
be  "publicly  known".  While  interesting  (and  non-trivial),  TN*  is  somewhat  lame  as  a 
characterization of 5*,  since it involves restrictions on common beliefs the:mselves. As a result,, 
there is no straightforward way to infer sufficiency of  C  from  that  of TN*.  This problem is 
overcome by the following condition c*: 
We will call C*  the  *-Compatibility  Axiom. It says that if individual i believes that it is common 
belief that  A  then it  is  not  the  case that  individual j believes that  not  A.  Thus  C*  requires 
individuals'  beliefs  about  what  is  commonly  believed  to  be "not  too  far  from  the  truth". Proposition  2,  which  is  proved  in  Appendix 2,  gives  a characterization of' C*  in  terms of a 
property of the set of accessibility relations. 
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PROPOSITION  2.  Axiom C  is characterized by  the following property of the set 
22 = {R,,  ..,,  Rn)  (where R  is  the  accessibility  relation of individual i,  i = 1,  ...,  n).  Let 
R,  = Tr UR  be the transitive closure of the union of the individual accessibility relations. 
*-Compatibility:  Vi, b'j, Va, 3 P, 3y : aR@  and PR*y and aRy. 
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Our main result is contained in Theorem 1 below. 
THEOREM  1.  Assume that, for every individual i, the belief operator /TJ satisfies axioms 
D and 5 (as well as K and the rule of Necessitation). Then the following axiorris are equivalent. 
(i)  5*  (+JA  +~+JA), 
(ii)  TN*  (/TJ  ITJ  A +  A), 
(iii)  C*  (a  q  A +  TO  ?A). 
ProoJ: (i) 3  (ii). The proof is as follows (PL stands for "Propositional Logic"): 
1.  lmA+ElmA  (5*) 
2.  m+JA+D+JA  (SB:  see .Appendix 1) 
3.  OlaA + +JmA  @ for i) (ii) a  (iii). The proof is as follows: 
1.  ~~A+oA  (m*) 
2.  flA + OA  (SB: see Appendix 1) 
3.  mA-hO7A  @ forj) 
4.  OflA -+  T~-IA  (1, 2, 3, PL). 
The  more difficult  part  is  to prove that  (iii)  (i).  In  order  to do this we need  to 
introduce  a  new  property  of  relations (which  we  call  "quasi-euclideanness") and  prove  two 
lemmas. 
DEFINITION.  A binary relation R on a set W is called quasi-eucli'dean if it satisfies the 
following property: 
k 
'da,P,y~W,  if aRP  and aRy, then there exists an integer k 1  1 such that PR y 
where J~R; means that there is a path of length k from P to y (that is, there is a sequence 6,,  ..., 6, 
in W such that: (i) 6,  = 8, (ii) 6,  = y  and  (iii) for every j = 0,  ..., k- 1,  6,R&+,). 
(Thus quasi-euclideanness is a weakening of euclideanness, since the latter co'rresponds  to the 
case where k = 1). LEMMA  1.  Let R be a relation on the set W and let  Tr R  be its transitive closure (that 
is, the sma.llest transitive relation containing R). Then R is quasi-euclidean ifland  on& if  Tr R  is 
euclidean. 
Pmof. (3)  Let R be a quasi-euclidean relation and, to simplify the notation, denote the 
transitive closure of R by R,.  We want to prove that R,  is euclidean. The proof is illustrated in 
Figure 3. Fix arbitrary a,  P and y such that aR,P  and aR,y  We need to show that PR,y.  Since 
aR$,  there is sequence Po, Dl, ...,  pm  in W such that (i) Po = a, (ii) Dm = P and (iii) for every 
k = 0, ..., Im-  1,  PkRPk+l.  Similarly, since aR,y,  there is a sequence yo, y,, ...., ys  in W such that 
(i) yo = a, (ii) ys = y and (iii) for every t = 0,  ..., s-  1,  y,Ry,,.  Since &Dl  and aRy, and  R is quasi- 
euclidean, there is a positive integer e and an R-path of length  L from Pl to y',.  Let 6 be the first 
node on this path. We want to show that for every k 2 1 there is an R-path fiom P,  to 6. For k = 1 
we have already proved it. By quasi-euclideanness of R,  since P,R6 and P,Rfl,, there is an  R-path 
fiom p,  to 6. Let E be the first node on this path. Then, since P,RE and P,Rp,,, by euclideanness of R 
there is an R-path from P,  to E. Joining this path with the path from E to 6 we obtain an R-path fiom 
p,  to 6. B:y repeating this argument m times we obtain an R-path from pm  to is, that is, a path from P 
to 6 (since Dm = P). Joining this path with the path from 6 to y, and then with the path fiom y, to yt = 
y, we obtain an R-path from P to y. Hence, since R,  is the transitive closure of R, we have that 
P~Y. 
(c)  Let R be a binary relation on the set W, whose transitive closure, denoted by R*,  is 
euclidean. We want to show that R is quasi-euclidean. Fix arbitrary a,  P and y such that aRP  and a.Ry  Then we also have that aR$ and aR*y.  Since R,  is euclidean, it follows that  PR,y.  By 
definition oftransitive closure, this means that there exists a sequence 6,,  6,, ..., 6m  in W such that 
(i) 6,  = p,  (ii) 6m  = y and (iii) for every k = 0, ..., m-  I, BkR6k+l.  Hence R is quasi-euclidean. O 
FIGURE 3 
LEMMA  2.  Let  22  = {R,, s,  ..., Rn)  be a set of  binary relations on the set W and let 
U22  be their union.  If 
(1)  for all i = 1, ..., n,  R, is quasi-euclidean,  and 
(2)  the set {R,, %, .  .  .,  Rn)  satisfies the *-Compatibility  property, then  UR  is quasi-euclidean. 
Proof:  The proof is illustrated in Figure 4. Fix a,  6 and E such that a UR6 and  a URE. 
Then there exist i and j such that aR> and  aR,a.  By *-Compatibility  there exist  and y such that 
aRiJ pR,y  and aR,y, where R,  denotes the transitive closure of  UR  . By quasi-euclideanness of 
R,  there exists an Ri-path from 6 to P. By definition of transitive closure, there exists an  U~-~ath 
from P to y. Finally, by euclideanness of $, there exists an $-path  from y to E. Hence there is an 
uR -path from 6 to E,  that is,  UR  is quasi-euclidean.  O 
a 
FIGURE 4 
We can now complete the proof of Theorem 1. By Proposition  2,  C*  is valid in all 
frames where {R,, ..., Rn) satisfies *-Compatibility,  in  particular, in  the class of such frames 
where every R, is euclidean. By Lemma 2, in this class of frames UR  is quasi-euclidean and, by Lemma 1, the transitive closure R* of  UR  is euclidean. Since 5*  is valid in the class of fiames 
where  R* is  euclidean,  by  the completeness theorem  for  the logic of  common  belief (see 
Halpern (and Moses, 1992, Lismont, 1993, and Lismont and Mongin, 1994; see also Appendix 
l),  5*  is  a theorem of every  normal logic of common belief where the individuals'  belief 
operators satisfy axiom 5 and, fix-thermore, axiom C*  holds at the "interpersonal level" (recall 
that axiom D for every individual is a consequence of c*).  w 
Thus Theorem 1 says that a (normal) logic where the individual belief operators satis@ 
axioms  I)  (Consistency) and  5  (Negative  Introspection)  and  the  cornmion belief  operator 
satisfies axiom 5 is equivalent to a (normal) logic where the individual belief operators satisfy 
axiom 5 and, at the interpersonal level, axiom C*  is satisfied. (It  is worth noting that axiom 
4 - Positive Introspection - plays no role whatsoever in all the results proved in this section.) 
3. Intersubjective consistency of beliefs 
In this concluding section we shall discuss the relative strength of axioms T  (D A +  A), 
* 
C (m  A -+  Tm 7A)  and  C  (a  A + 10  7A).  The connections among these axioms and 
their internal structure are much clarified by relating them to four conditions on intersubjective 
beliefs implied by the Truth Axiom T (at the individual level); these conditior~s  might also prove 
quite valu.able in hture research on related matters. T and C prove to be significantly stronger 
*  * 
than C ;  in particular, they imply some "agreement" among individuals, which plays no role in C * 




TP  . 
The axioms come in two natural pairs, TN-TP  and IN-IP.  The T-axioms are simply instances of 
the Truth hiom  T: truth conditions on individuals' beliefs about others ' beliefs.  The I-axioms, 
on the other hand, are "internal" conditions on individual belief systems relating beliefs about the 
world to beliefs about other agents' beliefs. IN, for instance, forbids agents to knowingly disagree. 
IN and IP say, essentially, that individuals take others to know something whenever they believe 
it. This interpretation corresponds to the syntactical fact that the I-axioms derive from T not 
simply as instances but as implications based on the inference rule of Necessitation (as well as 
axiom schema K). Thus the I-axioms reflect not so much  T "per sen, but individuals' 
shared/common knowledge that T. 
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We use  the notation 0  A  as a short-hand for  -A.  Recall that, semantically,  A is true at world 
a if and only if  fir all  P such that aRiP, A is true at p. It is easy to see that, on Ithe  other hand, 
0  A is true at a if and only if  there exists a P such that aRiP  and A is true at p. Figure 5 below gives a complete picture of the implication relation among the seven 
presented axioms considered in isolation. The arcs are labeled by the assumptions on the 
individuad belief operators necessary to establish a particular implication; if an arc is absent, no 
implication holds, even with the strongest logic for individual belief, namely KD45. 
VVe  also have included a single implication of one axiom by others, namely that of C by the 
conjunct:ion of IP and TP. In the transitive case (that is, when axiom 4 is satisfied), this yields in 
fact a characterization of C. 
FIGURE 5 PR.OPOSITION 3.  The following holds: 
(i)  IP and TP  together imply  C, 
(ii)  C  and  4  together imply  IP  and  TP, 
(iii:)  C  and  5  together imply  TN. 
The proof of Proposition 3 is given in Appendix 2. 
Thus C has strong implications for truth of intersubjective beliefs; moreover, it crucially 
involves some intersubjective agreement. This is underlined by the example of'Figure 2 above, 
which shows that intersubjective truth alone (TP and TN) fails to guarantee Compatibility since it 
fails to imply any intersubjective agreement (IP or IN). Note that the frame of'Figure 2 satisfies 
the property of Proposition 2 and therefore it validates axiom C*  (it also validates 5*,  since the 
transitive c:losure of R,vR, is euclidean). In order to expand on the example of Figure 2 we need 
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the following lemma, which is proved in Appendix 2. 
LElMMA 3.  Axiom schemata TN and TP are valid in the class of frames that satisfjl the 
following :properties: 
(1)  R is serial for every i, 
(2)  Vi, b'j, b'a, VP, b'y,  aR,P & P%y  3aR.y.  J 
- 
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Note that Lemma 3 gives only a soundness result, not a characterization result. The frame of Figure 2 satisfies the properties of Lemma 3 and therefore it validates both 
TP  and  TN.  On  the  other  hand,  it  falsifies  both  IP  and  IN.  This  can  be  verified  easily  by 
considering a model based on that frame where a sentence p is true at a and false at  P. Indee~i, 
one then has that  it is  common belief that  I  and 2 disagree  (they "agree  to disagree"):  the 
formula  (a  ~(p)  A  (P))  is true at every world. 
Conversely, the example of Figure 6 shows that intersubjective agreement has nothing to 
*  * 
do with intersubjective truth, hence, a fortiori, it has nothing to do with C  (respectively, 5 ). 
11nsert Figure 61 
FIGURE 6 
Figure 6 can be used to show that it is possible for IP and IN to be valid while, at the same time, 
TN, TP, C*  and 5* are falsified. Consider a model based on the frame of Figure 6 where a given FIGURE 7 Appendix  1 
In this appendix we review the axiomatic characterization of common belief (for more 
details see Bonanno, 1994, Halpem and Moses, 1992, Lismont, 1993, Lism.ont  and Mongin, 
1994).  Given n individuais, let  be the belief operator of individual i = 1, ..., n and  the 
common belief operator. Consider the logic, call it the CB logic,  defined by the following axiom,s 
and rules of inference: 
AXIOM SCHEMATA 
(I)  all the tautologies 
(2)  for every j  E (1, ..., n, *),  axiom schema K: 
Q(A-+B)A~A  + BB 
(3)  for all  i  E { 1, .. ., n) axiom schema SB: 
@A  -+  BA 
(4)  for all i E { 1, ..., n) axiom schema PR: 
mA  -+  E@A 
RULES OF INFERENCE 
A,A+B 
(1)  Modus Ponens: 
(2) Necessitation: for a!l  j E { 1, ..., n, *), 
(3)  Truism (or RI): 
A3111  ... A~A 
The semantics of common belief is as follows. A standard n-pame i:s an (n+l)-tuplz 
(w, R,, ..., Rn) where: 
(1)  W is a non-empty set whose members are called "possible worlds", or simply "worlds" 
and are denoted by a, P, y, ..., 
(2)  For every ie{l,  ...,  n) R, is a (possibly empty) binary "accessibility"  relation on W A standard n-model is an (n+2)-tuple m = (w, R,, ..., Rn, F), where (w,  R,, ..., R~)  is a 
W 
standard n-frame and F : S +  2  is a function ffom the set of sentence letters S into the set of 
subsets of W  We say that  is based on the frame (w, R,, ..., R~). 
Given a formula A and a standard n-model  W= (w,  R,, ..., Rn, F), the truth set of A in 
m 
%?,  denoted by  11 All  , is defined recursively as follows: 
m 
(1)  If A = (p) where p is a sentence letter, then  11 All  = F(p), 
(2)  (l--,A/lrn=  W-I~All"(thatis, IITAII~  isthecomplementof~~A~lm) 
(3)  IIA~BII~=  IIAII'U IIBII~, 
(4)  Foralli= 1,  ..., n,  l~flAll~={aEW  :  forallpsuchthataRip, PEIIA~~~], 
(5)  11  All   as^  :  for all p such that aR$,  pc 11 All "  1, 
m 
where  Rt is the transitive closure of  R, v .  u Rn  (see footnote 5).  If  as  // All  we say that 
m  m 
A is tnre 1x1 ~~orld  a ii1 model  %"I  An alternative notation for  a€  11 All  is  C  A  and an 
a 
m 
alternative notation for  ac  11 All  is  I+'  A. 
a 
A. formula A is valid in model  = (w, R,, ..., Rn,  F) if and only if  11 All  = W,  that is, 
if and only if  C '  .4  for all ac  W 
a 
Halpern and Moses (1992) and Lismont (1993) proved the following completeness 
theorem: If A is a theorem of the logic CB, then A is valid in every standard n-model; conversely, 
if A is a formula that is valid in every standard n-model, then A is a theorem of the logic CB. 
It follows from the characterization of axiom 4 (Positive Introspection: see Section 2) that 
the following is a theorem of the logic CB:  A -+  A. Appendix 2 
In this appendix we prove Propositions 1, 2, 3 and Lemmas 3 and 4, as well as a few extra 
results. First we need to recall some definitions and notation from modal logic (cf Chellas, 1980). 
We say that an axiom schema S is characterized by the class T?  of standard n-frames (for 
a definition of standard n-frames see Appendix 1) if and only if 
(1)  every instance of  S is valid in every model based on a Frame in 3, and 
(2)  if  (w, R,, ..., Rn ) is a frame that does not belong to 23  then there is a model  B7  = 
(w,  R,, .., Rn,  F) based on it and an instance A of  S such that A is not valid in  87  (that 
m  is, for some world a in  W,  #  A).  a 
We now prove Proposition 1, which states that axiom schema  C:  A +  10  TA 
is charact:erized by the class of standard frames that satis@ the Compatibility property: 
V i,  Vj, V a, 3 b  such that  and  aRjX 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.  (1) Let (w, R,, ..., R~)  be a frame that satisfies the 
Compatibility property. Let  3n be a model based on this Frame. Fix arbitrary i, j and a and an 
arbitrary formula A. Suppose that I=  rn  A. Then  C '  A  for all y such that a,Riy. By 
a  Y 
Compatibility, there exists a b such that aRip  and aR,i  Hence grn  _A, that is,  a (2) Let (w,  R,, ..., R~)  be a frame that violates the Compatibility property. Then there 
exist i, j and a such that, for no J3, aRiJ3  and qJ3.  Three cases are possible: (2.1) there is no 
world which is Rj-accessible from a, (2.2) there is no world which is Ri-accessible from a, 
(2.3) there are worlds Ri-accessible  from a and there are worlds 5-accessible from a but no 
world is both Ri-accessible  and 5-accessible from a . In case (2.1) choose an arbitrary model  W 
based on this frame. Then, for every formula A,  C '  A (see Chellas, p. 77). Let B be a 
a 
tautology. Then C "  rn 1B.  Whether or not there are worlds that are Ri-accessible  from a,  it 
a 
m  must be C "  q  B. Thus  t+  (m  B +-  lB).  Case (2.2.) is dealt with in a similar way. 
a  a 
Finally, consider case (2.3). Let T.  = (ye  W I aRiy) and Tj = {yew  / 9).  Then T. + 0,  T.  + 0 
J 
and T. n  I'.  = 0.  Let p be a sentence letter and  3n  be a model based on this frame such that F(p)  '  J 
".  = 11 (P)  11 '  = Ti. Then  C  (p) and C rn rn ,(p).  Thus I#  (a  (p) -+ +J  --,(p)).  a  a  a 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.  (1) Let (w, R,,  ..., R~)  be a frame that satisfies the 
*-Compat:ibility property. Let  W  be a model based on this frame. Fix arbitrary i, j and a and an 
arbitrary formula A. Suppose that  i=  rn  A. Then by *-Compatibility  there exist  P and y 
a 
such that  052, J3,  PR*y and a;/.  It follows from aiJ3  that b "  A and from the fact that PRj 
P 
that  C "A.  Since &,y,  C "  TO ?A. 
Y  a 
(2) Let (w,  R,, ..,  R ) be a frame that violates the +-Compatibility property. Then 
there exist i, j and a such that, for all p and for all y, if aRiP and J~RJ  then not aRjP. Let p be a sentence letter and let  111  be a model based on this frame such that F(p) =  11  (p)II  m= r = 
(YEW  : 3  PEW with aR.P and  PR*y). Let B = {PEW  : dip).  Suppose first that B = 0.  Then 
also r = 0.  Since B = 0,  for every formula 4  t=  rn  A, in particular for A  =  (p).  Thus 
a 
Cam  (p).  On  the other hand, since r  = 0, C '  ~(p).  It follows that 
a 
kt,"  (m  (p) +  ~(p)).  Consider now the case where B f 0. Fix an arbitrary P such that 
m  aRiP.  Then  C=  (p)  (this is true, trivially, in the case where there are no worlds that are R*- 
P 
accessible from b, and, by construction, also in the case where there are wor:lds that are 
R*-accessible from P, because every such world belongs to T). Hence  C '  ITJ  (p). On the 
a 
other hand, by hypothesis, for every yd,  it is not the case that aR,y.  Hence C rn  -,p. It 
a 
follows that gm  (m  (p) -+  ?(p)).  . 
a 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.  (i)  We want to show that C is a theorem of every 
system that contains axiom schemata IP and TP. The proof goes as follows (PL  stands for 
"Propositional Logic"): 
1.  OD~A  -t +JA  (W 
2  ~A-+~QA  (1, QL) (ii) First we show that IP is a theorem of every normal system containing axiom 4 at the 
individual level (that is, for every individual) and axiom C at the interpersonal level. The proof is 
as follows (RN stand for "Rule of Necessitation", MP for "Modus Ponens", PL for "Propositional 
Logic"). The proof is as follows: 
Next we show that TP is a theorem of every normal system containing axiom 4 at the 
individual level and axiom C at the interpersonal level: 
1.  mlA  -+  aalA  (axiom 4 for j) 
2.  aa7A+-+J+J1A  (axiom C) 
3.  ~TA++J+J~A  (12  , PL) (iii)  We want to show that TN is a theorem of every normal system containing axiom 5 at 
the individual level and axiom C at the interpersonal level. The proof is as fo;llows: 
1.  1DA  +  a70A  (axiom 5 for j) 
2.  UlDA  + +JDA  (axiom C:) 
3.  +JA  + 7OBA  (1,2 ,  PLO 
4.  aOA+DA  (3,PL).  H 
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.  (1) First we prove that axiom schema TN is valid in the class of 
frames that satis@ the two properties of Lemma 3.  Fix an arbitrary model based on a frame that 
satisfies those properties. Fix arbitrary i, j, a and an arbitrary formula A. Suppose that C ' A.  a 
By seriality of Ri there exists a P such that aR,P. Fix an arbitrary such P. Then C  q  A. By  P 
seriality of R,,  there exists a y such that PRjy Fix an arbitrary such y. Then C  A. By property (2) 
Y 
aRy.  Hence C '  A. 
J  a 
(2)  Now we turn to axioms schema TP. Fix an arbitrary model based on a frame that 
satisfies the two properties of Lemma 3. Fix arbitrary i, j, a  and an arbitrary fbrmula A. Suppose 
m..  that C  0  A. By seriality of Ri there exists a j3  such that aRiP  Then I= '' 0  A. Hence there 
a  P 
exists a y such that PR,y. and C '  A. By property (2) aRjy. Hence C '  A. . 
Y  CL PROOF OF LEMMA 4.  (1) First we prove validity of IN. Fix an arbitrary model based 
on a frame that satisfies the property of Lemma 4. Fix arbitrary i, j, a and an arbitrary formula A. 
Suppose that C  A. Then, by the property, there exists a P such that aRp.  Choose an 
a 
arbitrary such P. Then C  A. Choose an arbitrary y such that qy.  By the assumed property, 
P 
PRjy. Hence (since C  A) C  A. Therefore  != '  A. 
0  Y  a 
(2) Now we prove validity of IP. Fix an arbitrary model based on a fiarne that satisfies the 
property of Lemma 4. Fix arbitrary i, j, a and an arbitrary formula A. Suppose that C '  0  A 
a 
Then there exists a p such that aRip  and C lil rn A. By the assumed property (choosing y = p), 
P 
pR,P. Hence C '  A. Therefore, C lil 0  A. 
P  a 
We conclude this Appendix by proving two claims made in Section 2. 
CLAIM 1.  Axiom schema 5*  is equivalent to axiom schema P*: +J  A +  -m  A . 
Proof  (1) First we prove that 5*  implies P*: 
1.  lmA-qFJlpJA 
2.  mipJA+nimA 
3.  1mA+O+JA 
(5*> 
(SB: see Appendix 1) 
(1, 2, PL). (2) Next we prove that P*  implies 5*. 
1.  l@A+nl@A 
n+l.  +JA+  (mlo~  A  ..  A  o+A))  (1, ..., n, PL) 
n+2.  (O+JA  A  ... A  O++JA))  +Blm~  (n+l, Truism: see Appendix 1) 
nt3.  +JA+@+JA  (  (n+l, n+2, PL). . 
CLAIM 2.  If individual beliefs satisfy axiom D (consistency) then the following is a 
theorem of the logic CB:  A + l@  A  (which is equivalent to:  /TJ A +  +J  +J  A). 
Prooj  1.  ~JA--+~@A  (PR: see Appendix 1) 
2.  /TJ@A++J+JA  @ for i) 
3.  /TJA--++JT@A  (1, 2, PL). . References 
Aumann, R. (1976), Agreeing to disagree, Annals of  Statistics, 4, 1236-1239. 
Bacharach,  M.  (1985),  Some  extensions  of  a  claim  of  Aumann  in  an  axiomatic  model  of 
knowledge, Journal of  Economic Theory, 37, 167-190. 
Binmore,  K.  and  A.  Brandenburger  (1990),  Common  knowledge  and  game  theory,  in:  K. 
Binmore, Essays on the  foundations of  game theory, Basil Blackwell, Cambridge, MA. 
Bonanno, G. (1994), The logic of shared belief, public rumor, public shared belief and common 
belief, Working Paper #94-  10, Department of Economics, University 0.f California, Davis. 
Brandenburger,  A.  and  E. Dekel  (1987), Common  knowledge with  probability 1,  Journal of 
Matheniatical Economics, 16, 23 7-246. 
Chellas, B. (1 98O), Modal logic, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Colombetti, M. (1  993), Formal semantics for mutual beliefs, Art~ficial  intelligence, 62, 341  -353. 
Geanakoplos, J. (1992), Common knowledge, Journal of  Economic Perspectives, 6, 53-82. 
Geanakoplos, J. and H. Polemarchakis (1982), We can't  disagree forever, Journal of  Economic 
Theory, 28, 192-200. 
Halpern, J. (1986), Reasoning about  knowledge: an  overview, in  J. Halperr~  (Ed.), Theoretical 
aspects of  reasoning about knowledge, Morgan Kaufmann, Los Altos, CA, 1-1  7. 
Halpern, J. and Y. Moses (1992), A guide to completeness and complexity for modal logics of 
knowledge and belief, ArtrJicial intelligence, 54, 3  19-379. 
Hintikka, J. (1  962), Knowledge and  belief,  Cornell University Press, Ithaca (NY). 
Kaneko,  M.  and  T.  Nagashima  (1993),  Indefinability of  the  common  knowledge concept  in 
finitary logics, Working Paper No. 551, Institut of Socio-Economic I?lanning, University 
of Tsukuba. 
Lewis,  D. (1969),  Convei~tion: a philosophical  s~u@,  Harvard  University  Press,  Cambridge 
(MA). 
Lismont,  L.  (1993),  La  connaissance  commune  en  logique  modale,  Mathematical  Logzc 
Quarterly, 3  9, 1  15-  13  0. 
Lisrnont, L. and  P. Mongin  (1994), On  the logic of common  belief and  c'ornrnon knowledge, 
7heory and  Decision, 3  7, 75- 106. Milgrom, P.  (1981), An  axiomatic characterization of common  knowledge, Econometrics, 49, 
2 19-222. 
Monderer, D.  and  D. Samet  (1989), Approximating common knowledge with  common  belief, 
Games and Economic Behavior, 1, 170- 190. 
Rubinstein, .A. and  A. Wolinsky (1990), On  the logic of "Agreeing to Disagree" type of results, 
Journal of  Economic Theov, 5  1, 1  84-  193. 
Samet, 1).  (I 990), Ignoring ignorance and agreeing to disagree, Journal of  Economic Theory, 52, 
190-:207. 
Shin, H. (1993), Logical structure of common knowledge, Journal of  Economic Theory, 60, 1- 
13. 
Tan, T. and  S.  Werlang  (1985), On  Aumann's  notion of common  knowledge: an  alternative 
approach, mimeo, Department of Economics, Princeton University. 